ThreatCrush — Authorization and Module Loading

Remediation reflects the reviewed branch. Released patched versions, if any, are listed in the linked advisory.

Engagement summary. The full technical report is available under NDA.

Summary

Source review and isolated HTTP verification focused on authorization boundaries, module loading and web application controls.

Document record

Author
Eduardo Camarillo [Noir0x63]
Published
Version
v1.0
Language
English

1. Scope and Method

Source review of the ThreatCrush monorepo combined with targeted HTTP verification in an isolated Podman container. The reviewed scope included the web, CLI and desktop applications plus Supabase migrations.

2. Selected Findings

TC-01: RLS Update Policy

The Row Level Security (RLS) policy on user_profiles lacked a WITH CHECK expression. Any authenticated user could send an UPDATE payload setting is_admin = true, gaining unrestricted platform control.

Remediation in the reviewed branch: WITH CHECK policy applied.

TC-32: Daemon Module Loading

The threatcrushd daemon dynamically imported unsigned modules installed from the public marketplace or arbitrary Git URLs. The advisory describes the daemon running as root; installation and import are the relevant trust boundaries. It does not demonstrate direct evaluation of code received from unauthenticated network sockets.

Remediation in the reviewed branch: signed-module verification and non-root isolation.

Primary evidence: Relevant published advisory. The advisory records the affected versions and technical mechanism; a fix or retest requires separate evidence.

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